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I. Problem
In recent years, force has increasingly been used as a means of settling
disputes in the Southern African region.' The unfinished struggle for
decolonization, rising demands for self-determination, and the system of
apartheid have figured prominently among the factors contributing to
this increase. This incident focuses on South Africa's military incursion
into three neighboring African states-Botswana, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe-in May 1986.2 Relying extensively on the reactions of the
* This paper is a contribution to the narration and study of incidents as a new genre in
international law. It therefore follows the format set out in Reisman, International Incidents:
Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1984),
and Willard, Incidents: An Essay in Method, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 21 (1984).
t LL.M. Candidate, Yale University. I would like to thank Professor W. Michael Reis-
man for his excellent supervision and guidance in earlier drafts of this study.
1. The "Southern African" region is comprised of the following states: Angola, Botswana,
Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. The phrase
"Southern African states" refers to all of these states with the exception of South Africa.
2. Although the attacks were conducted in three separate areas, they all took place within
a twelve-hour period. For purposes of this study, the attacks are treated as one incident. This
was the first time that South Africa had conducted raids into more than one country simulta-
neously. It was also the first time that Zimbabwe had been a target. However, the May incident
was only one example, albeit "the most comprehensive yet conducted by [Botha's] beleaguered
government," in a long history of intrusions into, and raids on, select targets in neighboring
countries. The Times (London), May 20, 1986, at 17, col. 1. For example, in June 1985, South
African Defence Force (S.A.D.F.) troops crossed the South African border into Botswana and
raided several homes in the city of Gaborone that were occupied by supporters of the ANC.
U.N. Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2598th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/
PV.2598, at 4-5 (June 21, 1985) [hereinafter Security Council, 2598th Meeting]. In May 1985,
S.A.D.F. special commandos were caught while in the process of launching an attack against
one of Angola's oil installations in the Cabinda Gulf Oil compound. See generally U.N. Secur-
ity Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2596th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2596, at 7-
40 (June 20, 1985). In December 1982, the S.A.D.F. attacked targets in Maseru, the capital of
Lesotho, and destroyed a number of houses and apartment buildings alleged to be African
National Congress (ANC) bases which had sent guerrillas into South Africa. See Letter Dated
9 December 1982from the Representative of Lesotho to the President of the Security Council, 37
U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1982) at 61, U.N. Doc. S/15515 (1982). Similar incidents have
occurred in Mozambique and Swaziland. Although the facts have been disputed in a few of
these raids, all have at least one thing in common: in each, South Africa argued that its use of
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international community, particularly state elites, it analyzes the extent
to which international legal norms concerning self-defense and national
liberation movements were clarified or modified and assesses their pres-
ent status in contemporary international law.3
Several resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) have recognized the legitimacy of
resort to armed force by national liberation movements and called upon
member states to contribute moral and material assistance to such move-
ments.4 Pursuant to these resolutions, a number of Southern African
states support, through a variety of means, liberation movements like the
African National Congress (ANC).5 In retaliation, South Africa has vio-
lated the territorial sovereignty of these states.6 It has repeatedly at-
tacked and occupied Angolan territory, raided Zambia, Botswana, and
Lesotho, and trained and armed soldiers fighting the Mozambican
government. 7
force was in self-defense because the attacked targets were ANC bases used for housing guer-
rillas, storing weapons, or planning attacks into South Africa. See generally U.N. Security
Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2597th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2597, at 22-27
(June 20, 1985) [hereinafter Security Council, 2597th Meeting].
3. It must be stressed that an incident study relies "not so much [on] what happened as
[on] what effective elites think happened and how they react[ed]." Reisman, supra note *, at
17. In this context, "effective elites" are those persons or groups whose participation in, or
reaction to, an incident critically affects the outcome. See Willard, supra note *, at 25.
4. A quintessential example is the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/
8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations]. It specifically provides that "[i]n
their actions against, and resistance to ... forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their
right to self-determination ... [,] peoples [under colonial and racist regimes or other alien
forms of domination] are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter." Id. at 124; see also Definition ofAggression, G.A. Res.
3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (containing similar
language). The OAU has indicated that it "[c]ommends the national liberation movements,
particularly the ANC, as well as the oppressed people of South Africa for intensifying armed
and sabotage actions against the racist regime," and has called upon the international commu-
nity to increase its material, financial, and military assistance to the national liberation move-
ments of South Africa "in order to enhance their capability to intensify the struggle for
freedom and justice, particularly the armed struggle." Nairobi Resolution of the 37th Ordi-
nary Session of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers, O.A.U. CM/Res. 854 (XXXVII), reprinted
in 14 AFR. CONTEMP. REc. c-6, c-7 (1981-82) [hereinafter Nairobi Resolution]; see also
O.A.U. CM/Res. 720 (XXXIII), reprinted in 12 AFR. CONTEMP. REC. c-5 (1979-80).
5. Some of this support has been coordinated by the Liberation Committee of the OAU,
which was established specifically to coordinate support for liberation movements. See Payne,
Sub-Saharan Africa: The Right of Intervention in the Name of Humanity, 2 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 89, 90-91 (Supp. 1 1972).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 18-21; see also Report of the United Nations Council
for Namibia, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 24), U.N. Doc. A/40/24 (1986) [hereinafter Namibia
Report].
7. Id. at 43-54.
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The situation in the Southern African region poses a grave threat to
regional peace and security and, consequently, to the maintenance of
"minimum order."8 Various contemporary international legal issues are
implicated by the presence of the ANC in Southern African states and by
South Africa's attacks on those states. These issues include: whether a
distinction can be drawn between national liberation movements and ter-
rorist organizations; if so, under what circumstances, using what criteria,
and by whom is the distinction to be drawn; into which category does the
ANC fall; is it legal for the Southern African states to grant groups like
the ANC the use of their territories as transit routes or for launching
raids into South Africa; whether such a grant is a form of "aggression"
or "armed attack" that triggers South Africa's right to legitimate self-
defense; and whether contemporary international law recognizes the
right of a government to prevent a people from fighting for its claim to
self-determination.
The term "national liberation movement" must be clarified at the out-
set. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the problem of auto-
interpretation 9 in international law makes it possible for states to de-
scribe any organization as a "national liberation group" or "freedom
fighters," or as a "terrorist organization," to fit their political purposes.
The conflicting claims in the South African incident testify to this di-
lemma. The gravity of the problem is further highlighted by events in
areas like Central America o and Angola.1
8. "Minimum order" refers to an international system "which establishes as authoritative,
and seeks to make effective, the principle that force, or highly intense coercion, is reserved in
community monopoly for support of processes of persuasion and agreement and is not to be
used as an instrument of unauthorized change." M. McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER xi-xii (1987).
9. Professor McDougal has written that "[tihe special prerogative claimed by states to
interpret their own obligation, and in a sense to act as judges of their own cause, has long been
regarded as a conspicuous Achilles heel in international law." McDougal, The Impact of In-
ternational Law upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 437,
459 (M. McDougal & W. Reisman eds. 1981) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS].
10. The contra forces in Nicaragua, for example, are categorized by the Reagan Adminis-
tration as "freedom fighters," and extolled as "the moral equivalent of our Founding Fathers
and the brave men and women of the French Resistance." Russell, The Propaganda War,
TIME, Mar. 11, 1985, at 34, 35. In contrast, the Sandinista government regards them as "no
more than bands of mercenaries which have been recruited, organized, paid and commanded
by the Government of the United States." Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 1, 64, para. 114 (Judgment of June 27) [herein-
after Nicaragua, Merits].
11. The U.S. government is actively supporting the National Union for Total Indepen-
dence of Angola (UNITA) movement of Jonas Savimbi, which is seeking to overthrow the
Angolan government. UNITA is perceived by the United States as a liberation group fighting
to restore democracy to Angola. It is thus considered to be "a legitimate political force in
Angola," Legum, The Southern African Crisis, 14 AFR. CONTEMP. REC. a-37 (1981-82), and as
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If the rights accorded to freedom fighters and national liberation
groups are to have any meaningful content, a set of criteria must be de-
veloped for ascertaining which groups should be characterized as libera-
tion movements and which as terrorist movements. Prior recognition of
an armed resistance group by the international community is strong evi-
dence that the group should be considered a "liberation movement" and
not a "terrorist movement." "International community," in this context,
is defined as a preponderant number of states, regional organizations,
and other international bodies like the United Nations (U.N.) and its
agencies. The standard for a liberation group should be as circumscribed
as possible, so as to make it difficult for small, non-representative groups
with self-serving interests to carry out armed attacks against legitimate
governments under the guise of promoting self-determination and human
dignity.
In deciding whether to recognize a group as a liberation movement,
states must weigh the implications of recognition for the community or
region in which the recognized group operates, whether the group serves
an important societal interest, and, finally, the precedential value of
granting recognition to the group.12 Applying these criteria to the ANC,
one is led to the conclusion that it is a legitimate national liberation
movement. 13 It has been accorded this status by the OAU and the
U.N.;14 it is broad-based and represents a substantial portion of South
Africans; its activities are geared towards the eradication of apartheid;
and its expressed goal is a democratic, non-racist, and united South Af-
rica, with positive implications for the peace and security of the whole
Southern African region.
"an important indigenous nationalist movement" waging "a determined armed struggle
against the MPLA... government's monopoly of power," Southern Africa: Toward an Ameri-
can Consensus (address by Secretary of State Shultz before the National Press Club on Apr.
16, 1985), 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 22, 25 (June 1985). This view conflicts with the perception of
the OAU Council of Ministers that UNITA is a dissident group of "racist-trained bandits,"
Nairobi Resolution, supra note 4, at c-7, and "Angolan traitors in the pay of the racist Pretoria
regime," id. at c-28.
12. The notion of "national liberation," according to Reisman, "must be tested in present
and projected contexts: considering all features of the context, what will the success of one
side or another mean to members of the community involved, to their region, to the world?
Will the success of either side lead to a greater approximation of human dignity?" Reisman,
Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, in INTERNATIONAL LAW Es-
SAYS, supra note 9, at 145.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 99-106.
14. See, e.g., Question ofNamibia, G.A. Res. 39/50, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 29,
U.N. Doe. A/39/51 (1984).
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II. Facts
Shortly after midnight on May 19, 1986, South African commandos
bombed an ANC office in downtown Harare, Zimbabwe. 15 The com-
mandos, wielding automatic weapons, also attacked an alleged ANC
house in Ashdown Park, approximately five miles from Harare. 16 After
a ten-minute spate of explosions and gunfire, the troops escaped in rented
cars.
17
At 6:30 a.m. the same day, South African Defence Force helicopters
fired at the Botswana Defense Force barracks in Mogaditshane, near the
capital, Gabarone.18 Simultaneously, forces supported by helicopters at-
tacked a civilian housing complex in the same city. As a result of these
attacks, one Botswanan was killed, two others were critically injured,
and property was extensively damaged.19 South African helicopters also
dropped leaflets accusing the Botswanan government of supporting the
ANC.20
In Zambia, two S.A.D.F. aircraft attacked a housing settlement and
refugee center in Makeni, near Lusaka, at 8:50 a.m. The airplanes
dropped bombs and fired rockets, killing one person and wounding ten
others, including two Angolan refugee children. 21
The South African government's version of the incident differed signif-
icantly from the versions put forward by the Botswanan, Zambian, and
Zimbabwean governments, as did South Africa's conception of the law-
fulness of its attacks. For example, South Africa insisted that the build-
ing it destroyed in Zambia was an operational center of the ANC.22
Zambia, however, denied this, claiming that the building was a U.N.
transit center which operated under a tripartite agreement among the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the government of Zambia, and
the Christian Council of Zambia. 23
South Africa also argued that the housing complex that it had at-
tacked in Botswana contained some rooms rented by the ANC to house
15. See N.Y. Times, May 20, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
16. Smith, The Commando Offensive, TIME, June 2, 1986, at 38-39.
17. Id.
18. See U.N. Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2684th Meeting, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.2684, at 14-15 (May 22, 1986) [hereinafter Security Council, 2684th Meeting].
19. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 16.
20. Id.
21. Wash. Post, May 20, 1986, at Al, col. 1; see also Security Council, 2684th Meeting,
supra note 18, at 13.
22. Security Council, 2684th Meeting, supra note 18, at 22.
23. Id. at 13.
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guerrillas before they infiltrated back into South Africa.24 The govern-
ment of Botswana, however, said that the housing complex "did not even
have refugees as tenants, let alone ANC gangsters, which in the first
place we have never had in Botswana.' ' 25 Only with respect to
Zimbabwe was there agreement that the target was indeed an ANC
office.
The diverging conceptions of lawfulness put forward by South Africa
and the Southern African states concerning this incident form the subject
of this essay.
III. A Conflict of Perspective-The Claims and Counterclaims
of Participants
Elites in South Africa and other Southern African states held diver-
gent expectations of the normative content of the international legal rules
governing the use of force. South Africa viewed its actions as appropri-
ate for the defense and security of its people, and for the elimination of
"terrorist" elements operating from neighboring countries. 26 The South-
ern African states, on the other hand, considered the attacks by South
Africa to be part of a pattern of persistent aggression against, and
destabilization of, neighboring independent states. 27 The legal arguments
of each centered around two main issues: first, situations in which a state
can legitimately invoke a right to self-defense, and second, the status of
national liberation movements under international law.
A. The Right of Self-Defense
The South African government viewed the raids as an exercise of legit-
imate self-defense. It contended that its security interests were
threatened by the actions of the ANC, which it perceived as a terrorist
organization based in neighboring African states:
South Africa will not tolerate activities endangering our security. We will
not hesitate to take whatever action may be appropriate for the defense and
security of our people and for the elimination of terrorist elements who are
intent on sowing death and destruction in our country and in our region.
24. See Hornsby, Three Die in Pre-Dawn Raids, The Times (London), May 20, 1986, at 1,
col. 6.
25. U.N. Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2686th Meeting, U.N.Doc.
S/PV.2686, at 52 (May 23, 1986) [hereinafter Security Council, 2686th Meeting].
26. See infra text accompanying notes 28-32.
27. See Security Council, 2686th Meeting, supra note 25, at 51-61 (statement by Bot-
swanan representative); id. at 81-96 (statement by Zimbabwean representative); Security
Council, 2684th Meeting, supra note 18, at 12-21 (statement by Zambian representative).
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We will not allow ourselves to be attacked with impunity. We shall take
whatever steps are appropriate to defend ourselves. 28
South Africa claimed that its neighbors, by allowing the ANC to set up
bases in their territories from which transboundary raids were launched
into South Africa, were guilty of actively assisting armed attack against
South Africa. South Africa was therefore entitled to exercise its right of
self-defense, using whatever methods it deemed appropriate. 29 The
South African claim was also based on the customary international law
principle that "a State may not permit or encourage on its territory activ-
ities for the purpose of carrying out acts of violence" in other states. 30
Finally, South Africa justified its actions by reference to the position
taken by Western countries against international terrorism. Citing in
particular the U.S. attack on Libya, 31 it argued that it was entitled to
"fight international terrorism in precisely the same way as other Western
countries, despite the sanctimonious protests of the guardian of interna-
tional terrorist movements, the United Nations. '32
In contrast, Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe denied the applicability
of the self-defense doctrine to the raids. They argued that South Africa's
self-defense justification possessed neither moral nor legal validity,33 but
instead was a "flagrant violation of all international norms of conduct
and a blatant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity" of the
28. Security Council, 2684th Meeting, supra note 18, at 27-30 (statement by South African
representative).
29. See U.N. Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2597th Meeting, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.2597, at 22-25 (June 20, 1985).
30. Id. at 26. This principle is enshrined in the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra
note 4. The Declaration provides in relevant part:
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of
irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of
another State.
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participat-
ing in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized
activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts
referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.
Id. at 123.
31. On April 14, 1986, a month before South Africa's raids, the United States had con-
ducted simultaneous air strikes on installations in Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya, as a means of
deterring further terrorist attacks by Libya. Oakley, International Terrorism, 65 FOREIGN
AFF. 611, 617 (1987). South Africa thus justified its action as "anti-terrorist" by invoking the
U.S. attack on Libya as precedent. See de St. Jorre, South Africa Embattled, 65 FOREIGN AFF.
538, 545 (1987).
32. Smith, supra note 16, at 39 (statement by South African President Botha). The South
African foreign minister stated: "[W]e simply do not understand how it is possible for the U.S.
to attack bases and terrorists in Libya, to proclaim that the U.S. will protect U.S. interests and
citizens against any form of terrorism wherever it occurs, and then urge all governments in the
world to do the same, but when we do it and, with all respect, do it more professionally than
they do, the U.S. blames us." TIME, June 9, 1986, at 38.
33. Security Council, 2686th Meeting, supra note 25, at 87.
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three countries. 34 These countries maintained that South Africa's self-
defense argument was inapplicable because "defense of territory takes
place within borders and not by means of adventurist expeditions. 3 5
They further insisted that, although South Africa had used the self-de-
fense justification for similar raids into neighboring African states in the
past, the international community had never accepted it.36 Finally, the
Southern African states claimed that the U.S. attack on Libya could not
be cited as precedent, because that incident had not been afforded the
approval of the international community.37
B. National Liberation Movements
Despite widespread recognition of the ANC by the international com-
munity, the South African government regards the ANC as a terrorist
organization. 38 Furthermore, South Africa maintains that even if the
ANC is considered a liberation movement, it does not follow that other
African states can legally grant it the use of their territories for launching
raids into South Africa.39
The Southern African states, on the other hand, argue that the ANC is
a national liberation movement recognized by the U.N. as well as by the
OAU. They maintain that, as members of the OAU, the U.N., and the
Non-Aligned Movement, they have an international obligation to allow
ANC offices in their territories. 40 Such support, according to this view,
is in conformity with international law, and is an exception to the princi-
ple of non-intervention. 41
34. Security Council, 2684th Meeting, supra note 18, at 13.
35. Id. at 11.
36. For the Zimbabwean view, see Security Council, 2686th Meeting, supra note 25, at 87-
88.
37. See, eg., id. (statement by the Zimbabwean representative).
38. See, eg., supra note 28 and accompanying text.
39. Id.
40. Security Council, 2686th Meeting, supra note 25, at 86-87. According to the
Zimbabwean representative, the obligation to provide offices to liberation movements like the
ANC has been accepted even by Western countries such as the United Kingdom and France,
and by the international community as a whole. It must be noted here that Botswana has
insistently maintained that it does not allow the ANC to use its territory as a base for guerrilla
operations against South Africa. See Security Council, 2598th Meeting, supra note 2, at 6
(address by Botswanan representative).
41. The African states have consistently held the view that assistance rendered to libera-
tion groups in colonial territories consistent with U.N. and OAU resolutions should not be
considered an act of provocation, and should not, therefore, expose the countries granting it to
reprisals. See, e.g., I REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS 56, 58 (Supp.
No. 4, Sept. 1966-Dec. 1969) (discussing the dispute that arose after Portugal's bombing of
Zambia, in alleged retaliation for Zambia's grant of assistance to liberation movements in the
then-Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique).
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These conflicting conceptions of lawfulness have emerged each time
South Africa has launched an incursion into its neighboring states. The
only new element in the debate surrounding the May 1986 incident was
South Africa's emphasis on combatting terrorism as a justification for its
action.42
IV. International Appraisal
The international community responded quickly and unequivocally to
the South African raids. From the standpoint of norm creation, some of
the most significant appraisals were those of Western countries, particu-
larly the United States and the United Kingdom.43 The United States
denounced the South African attacks as outrageous and inexplicable, dis-
tinguishing South Africa's raids on its neighbors from its own raid on
Libya. The United States stressed that Libya had become the primary
exporter of terrorism in the world. 44 But "[i]n this case, South Africa
and its neighbors.., were engaged in what appeared to be a constructive
solution to the problems they're experiencing with some dissident
groups"45 at the time of the South African attacks. As evidence of its
"outrage over the violation by the South African military of the sover-
42. For a discussion of the reasonableness of this claim, see infra text accompanying notes
82-87.
43. Elite expectations in the United States are likely to exert a decisive influence over the
outcome of future South African raids. In this instance, one of the principal arguments relied
on by South Africa was that Western countries also used force to counter terrorism, as in the
case of the U.S. action in Libya. The United States is also an important actor because of its
relationship with the government of South Africa. The position taken by the United King-
dom, because of its influential position in the West and its colonial ties to South Africa and
many of the other Southern African states, is also noteworthy. This is not to say, however,
that the reactions of the African states and of bodies like the United Nations and the Eastern
bloc are not important. It is only to acknowledge the fact that South Africa has shown little
respect for the views of these bodies in the past.
44. Matchet's Diary, W. AFR., June 2, 1986, at 1148. The U.S. representative at the Secur-
ity Council stated:
Libya is the world's principal proponent of State-sponsored terrorism....
On the other hand, the Governments of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe have made
serious efforts to end the vicious cycle of cross-border violence directed at South Africa.
It should therefore be obvious to all that there is no similarity whatsoever between the
terrorist-dominated foreign policy of Libya and the efforts to promote dialogue and co-
operation made by the three front-line States.
Security Council, 2686th Meeting, supra note 25, at 111. See also Leigh, Contemporary Prac-
tice of the United States Relating to International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 612, 633-36 (1986)
(quoting statement by U.N. representative Vernon A. Walters in a speech before the U.N.
Security Council).
45. See Matchet's Diary, supra note 44 (emphasis added). The U.S. government's allusion
to the timing of the raids as being "particularly inexplicable" raises a question as to whether it
would have found the raids acceptable if they had been carried out at a more appropriate time.
The U.S. government's position on the status of the ANC has vacillated. Its latest allusion to
the ANC as a "dissident group" suggests that it does not now regard the ANC as "terrorists."
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eignty of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe,"'46 the U.S. government ex-
pelled the South African military attach6 in Washington, and recalled its
own military attach6 in Pretoria.4 7
The rest of the international community reacted in a similar fashion.
The British government "'totally and utterly' condemned" the raids. 48
The European Economic Community expressed its outrage at South Af-
rican efforts to destabilize the Southern African region.49 The Common-
wealth Secretary-General, Shridath Ramphal, asserted that Pretoria had
"declared war against peace in Southern Africa."' 50 Canada recalled its
ambassador from Pretoria.51 Argentina broke off diplomatic relations
with South Africa.52 The Soviet Union denounced the raids as an act of
state terrorism, for which the U.S. attack on Libya had served as a
model. 53 And in Africa, the OAU Chairman described the raids as tan-
tamount to "state terrorism, '5 4 and the foreign ministers of the six
Southern African front-line states55 condemned the raids as the "latest
act of brutal aggression" by South Africa. 56
The incident was formally appraised by the U.N. Security Council. 7
A draft resolution submitted by the Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Trini-
dad and Tobago, and the United Arab Emirates sought both to condemn
South Africa for the raids and to impose on it limited and selective
46. Security Council, 2686th Meeting, supra note 25, at 111.
47. The U.S. government had condemned earlier South African raids in a similar fashion.
After the May 1985 raid on Angolan territory, for example, the United States was instrumen-
tal in effecting the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 567, which
condemned South Africa for its raids into a neighboring country. See Security Council,
2597th Meeting, supra note 2, at 71.
48. Webster, Angry Thatcher Still Rules Out Sanctions, The Times (London), May 21,
1986, at 1, col. 6.
49. Ashford, Pretoria Attacks Provoke Outrage, The Times (London), May 20, 1986, at 1,
col. 6.
50. Id.
51. Smith, supra note 16, at 38; see also Community Leads Sweeping Condemnation of
Attacks, The Times (London), May 21, 1986, at 7, col. 2.
52. Argentina based its decision on the conviction that the South African raids violated the
U.N. Charter and international law. Argentina also stated that its termination of diplomatic
relations with South Africa constituted "an expression of solidarity with the States of southern
Africa which have been the target of repeated and unjustifiable armed attacks by South Af-
rica." U.N. Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2685th Meeting, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.2685, at 32 (May 23, 1986) [hereinafter Security Council, 2685th Meeting].
53. Security Council, 2686th Meeting, supra note 25, at 26.
54. The Times (London), supra note 51, at 7, col. 3.
55. Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
56. The Times (London), supra note 51, at 7, col. 1. Similar condemnation came from
China. Id. at 7, col. 4.
57. See, e.g., Security Council debates on the incident. Security Council, 2684th-2686th
Meetings, supra notes 18, 52, 25.
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mandatory sanctions. 58 The resolution was vetoed by the United King-
dom and the United States. 59 The failure of the Security Council to con-
vey a potent and convincing signal to South Africa should not, however,
be construed as an acceptance of the lawfulness of South Africa's raids.
On the contrary, the vetoing nations explicitly stated that their only ob-
jection to the draft resolution condemning the raids was its call for
mandatory economic sanctions.60 Their vetoes did not detract from the
unanimity of the condemnation of the raids. 61 Debates at the Security
Council thus reinforced the normative expectations concerning the pro-
hibition of transboundary military force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of states.
While condemning the South African raids, the international commu-
nity remained conspicuously silent on the issue of the ANC and the law-
fulness of its activities. The failure of international elites to condemn the
ANC for its alleged terrorist actions could suggest a tacit acceptance of
the legality of the ANC's activities. The silence of the international com-
munity on this issue could also plausibly be explained by the fact that the
South African government had produced no hard evidence incriminating
the ANC in terrorist activities. It remains clear that although
Zimbabwe, for example, admitted having granted the ANC the use of its
territory,62 it was not criticized for following this policy. It might be
inferred through their silence on this issue that other states wished to
preserve for themselves the competence to grant liberation groups such
as the ANC the use of their territories in the future.
In its failure to condemn ANC activities in South Africa, the interna-
tional community manifested a high degree of tolerance for the activities
of national liberation movements in general, particularly in their fight for
freedom and self-determination. 63 In addition, the strong and unani-
58. See U.N. Security Council, Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Trinidad and Tobago and
United Arab Emirates: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doe. S/18087 (May 22, 1986).
59. See Security Council, 2686th Meeting, supra note 25, at 128-30.
60. See id. at 131-32 (statements by the U.S. and U.K. representatives). It is thus regretta-
ble that the sponsors of the draft resolution rejected the British proposal for a paragraph-by-
paragraph vote on the provisions of the resolution. A vote in this fashion would have resulted
at worst in a consensus resolution, arguably better than no resolution at all. It is important to
note, however, that the resolution failed to pass because of the British and U.S. governments'
long-held opposition to mandatory economic sanctions; this opposition had nothing to do with
the legality of the raids themselves.
61. In the words of the U.K. representative, "[1]et South Africa understand that we have
never countenanced and shall never countenance cross-border violations and South Africa's
illegitimate use of force against its neighbors." Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added); see also id. at
111 (statement by U.S. representative condemning raids).
62. See id. at 86-87 (statement by Zimbabwean representative).
63. It is undeniable that the concept of self-determination has become increasingly impor-
tant in the international legal system. The preeminence of this concept is manifest in U.N.
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mous criticism of the South African raids reinforced a cherished norm of
the international community: the obligation to settle international dis-
putes peacefully." After the raids, even the South African government
admitted that the problems of the Southern African region could not be
resolved by resort to violence, and stated that it was committed to resolv-
ing differences with its neighbors by peaceful means.65
The raids were particularly objectionable to the international commu-
nity because of their timing. The Commonwealth Eminent Persons
Group (E.P.G.) was attempting to mediate between Pretoria and the
ANC at the time of the incursions.6 6 The governments of Botswana,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe were also engaged in discussions with South Af-
rica to end cross-border violence in the region. 67 In the case of Bot-
swana, for example, the raids took place four days ahead of a scheduled
meeting between it and South Africa to discuss border problems.6 8 Thus,
the reaction of the international community indicates that raids of the
kind perpetrated by South Africa are particularly objectionable when
peaceful means for resolving international disputes are available and
under use.
prescriptions, international judicial decisions, and scholarly opinion. It is expressly recognized
by the U.N. Charter in articles 1(2) and 55, and has been progressively developed and codified
in numerous U.N. resolutions and declarations. It has also been recognized by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (I.C.J.) as "a right of peoples." See, e.g., Advisory Opinion on Western
Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 31. Self-determination has been described as "the fundamental principle of
legitimacy in contemporary international politics," and some scholars even advocate the use of
unilateral coercion for the "enhancement of the ongoing right of peoples to determine their
own political destinies." Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Arti-
cle 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642, 643 (1984). Self-determination has, in fact, been character-
ized as jus cogens, a peremptory norm of international law from which no derogation is
permitted. See Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND
HUMAN DIGNITY 198 (1976).
64. This norm, a natural and indispensable corollary to the prohibition on the threat or use
of force, is enshrined in articles 2(3) and 33 of the U.N. Charter. The I.C.J., in its most recent
decision on this issue, emphatically declared that this principle "has also the status of custom-
ary law." Nicaragua, Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 145, paras. 290-91.
65. See Security Council, 2684th Meeting, supra note 18, at 27-30 (statement by the South
African representative). However, South Africa in fact conducted an attack on Angola soon
after making this statement. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
66. The E.P.G. was set up at the Commonwealth's Heads of State and Government Sum-
mit Meeting in Nassau, Bahamas, in October 1985. The group was given a mandate to pro-
mote a dialogue on democracy in South Africa and to negotiate with Pretoria for a rapid end
to apartheid. Harding, Apartheid's Willing Bedfellow, AFRICA, Nov. 1985, at 42, 47.
67. Security Council, 2685th Meeting, supra note 52, at 7 (statement by U.S. representa-
tive, arguing that the raids were particularly inexplicable in light of ongoing efforts among
Southern African states to maintain good working relations and communication on security
problems).
68. This was confirmed by both the British and the Botswanan representatives. Security
Council, 2686th Meeting, supra note 25, at 16, 56.
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V. Outcome
The international community characterized South Africa's action as
part of an ongoing dispute in need of resolution. 69 Elites saw the incident
as one ramification of the weakening of normative restraints on the use of
force, particularly in the Southern African region.70 Three dimensions of
the situation in the region were identified: first, the existence of
apartheid; second, the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa;
and third, South Africa's aggression against, and destabilization of,
neighboring independent states.71 The primary issue to be addressed was
apartheid, since it was generally felt that its elimination would return
peace to the region.72
The raids also appear to have done little to further South Africa's
stated objectives.7 3 The President of the ANC openly asserted that the
South African raids would inspire his movement to escalate its attacks on
the Pretoria regime.74 So far, South Africa's attempts to force the ANC
to renounce the use of violence have backfired. In addition, the raids
appear to have improved the ANC's standing in the eyes of the interna-
tional community.75
Another significant result of the raids was the rejection by interna-
tional elites of South Africa's attempts to place the raids within the
broader framework of the fight against international terrorism. The re-
sponse of international elites to this effort suggests that there is a defina-
ble boundary between legitimate resistance and international terrorism.
69. Id. at 7, 23; see also Security Council, 2685th Meeting, supra note 52, at 7.
70. See, eg., Security Council, 2684th Meeting, supra note 18, at 30-34 (remarks by the
Chairman of the Special Committee Against Apartheid); see also Security Council, 2685th
Meeting, supra note 52, at 5 (statement by the Australian representative).
71. See Security Council, 2684th Meeting, supra note 18, at 18.
72. Id. The Special Committee Against Apartheid stated that the primary past and pres-
ent cause of conflict in Southern Africa was the policy of apartheid pursued by the South
African regime. Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of South Africa, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 22) at 4, U.N. Doe. A/
8022/Rev.1 (1970). Apartheid was also deemed "the root cause of the conflict and instability
in Southern Africa" in the New Delhi Declaration of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-
Aligned Movement. See Security Council, 2684th Meeting, supra note 18, at 41; see also state-
ments by the French representative, Security Council, 2686th Meeting, supra note 25, at 7
(arguing that the policy of apartheid was the cause of the troubles afflicting the Southern
African region).
73. See de St. Jorre, supra note 31, at 545; see also Spence, Botha's Slap in the Face for the
West, The Times (London), May 20, 1986, at 16, col. 2 (stating that the raids' significance was
political rather than military).
74. McGregor, Bloodbath Warning to Pretoria, The Times (London), May 21, 1986, at 7,
col 1. Other heads of state, such as Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe, called for more
support for the ANC in its war against the South African government. See Ashford, supra
note 49.
75. Anderson, Pretoria's Suprise Show of Force, NEwsWEEK, June 2, 1986, at 33.
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State elites established the fact that the ANC had not been engaged in
"international terrorist" activity.76 The emergent norm is that the activi-
ties of recognized liberation movements like the ANC cannot be equated
with terrorism. Therefore, states that grant liberation movements or
"dissident groups" the use of their territories are not guilty of condoning
international terrorism. Moreover, their granting of this privilege does
not amount to an armed attack justifying legitimate self-defense. 77
Not only did the attacks fail to achieve South Africa's objectives, they
also resulted in increased appeal at the international level for mandatory
and comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa.78 In addi-
tion, the raids served to slow the diplomatic progress being made by in-
ternational elites in their efforts to restore peace to the region. The work
of the E.P.G., for example, was short-circuited. 79
Nonetheless, the worldwide criticism of the raids does not seem to
have had a discernible impact on the actions of the South African gov-
ernment. After the May incident, South Africa threatened that it would
"continue to strike against ANC base facilities in neighboring countries
in accordance with [its] legal right."' 80 It made good on this threat with
an attack on Angola, eight days after the raids on Botswana, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe.81
76. See Security Council, 2686th Meeting, supra note 25, at 11.
77. These issues are more extensively discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes
107-18.
78. This idea was neatly summed up by the President of the Security Council, speaking in
his capacity as the representative of Ghana. Security Council, 2686th Meeting, supra note 25,
at 102-08.
79. This resulted from the fact that the raids occurred while the E.P.G. was involved in
negotiations with South Africa and the ANC for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Id. In
the words of the Botswanan representative, "If the eminent persons' initiative is not dead-
killed by South Africa-it must be presumed to be so wounded, so deformed [that] it is as good
as dead alive [sic]." Id. at 59-60. Mr. Malcolm Fraser and General Obasanjo, co-chairmen of
the E.P.G., "acknowledged that South Africa's raids had struck the mission a serious blow."
E.P. G. Tries To Keep Its Hopes Alive, The Times (London), May 21, 1986, at 7, col. 4; see also
de St. Jorre, supra note 31, at 546 (arguing that this was in part a result of the fact that South
Africa had chosen to attack three of the Commonwealth countries that the E.P.G.
represented).
80. Anderson, supra note 75, at 80.
81. On June 5, 1986, S.A.D.F. troops launched a new raid against Angola in the South-
western province of Namibe, hitting oil tankers and cargo ships anchored at the port of
Namibe. Seven battalions of South African soldiers remained on Angolan territory and car-
ried out joint attacks with the UNITA rebels led by Jonas Savimbi. For a general discussion of
the June 5 raid, see U.N. Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2691st Meet-
ing, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2691, at 7 (June 16, 1986). See also U.N. Security Council, Provisional
Verbatim Record of the 2692nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2692 (June 17, 1986); U.N. Secur-
ity Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2693rd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2693 (June
18, 1986).
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VI. Writer's Appraisal
An informed appraisal of the South African raids must be made in the
context of the broader international legal norms that seek to maintain
minimum world order and human dignity. The outcome of this incident
may well have a positive effect on world order. The incident highlighted
the need to draw a definable boundary between legitimate resistance and
international terrorism. An anti-terrorism policy should be distinguished
from a policy of bare aggression against a liberation movement. This is
particularly true in light of the fact that international terrorism is an
extralegal activity,8 2 and therefore does not lend itself easily to legal anal-
ysis. The lack of a precise definition does not detract from the fact that
genuine terrorism can be identified when it is seen.83
The attempt made by South Africa to characterize certain acts of
ANC aggression as international terrorism was not accepted by state
elites.84 The legitimacy of the state elites' position arises from the in-
creased pressure which terrorism has placed on the conduct of interna-
tional relations. 85 It would serve no policy goal, for example, to treat
Abu Nidal-type activities and ANC-type activities in South Africa in a
mechanically like fashion. International terrorism is not conducive to
maintaining public order; but the already weakened normative restraints
on the use of force would be further vitiated if states were allowed arbi-
trarily to launch armed attacks against other states' territories on the
pretext of curbing international terrorism. A desirable conclusion to be
drawn from this incident would therefore be that a state must furnish the
international community with evidence of alleged terrorist activities in
order to legitimate an attack on terrorists. The establishment of such a
norm would discourage unwarranted deployments of transboundary
force.
82. See Laqueur, Reflections on Terrorism, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 86, 97 (1986).
83. Most experts on the subject agree that terrorism involves "the use or threat of violence,
a method of combat or a strategy to achieve certain goals, that its aim is to induce a state of
fear in the victim, that it is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian norms, and that
publicity is an essential factor in terrorist strategy." Id. at 88.
The U.S. government uses the term "international terrorism" to describe the premeditated
use of violence against non-combatant targets for political purposes, involving citizens or terri-
tory of more than one country. See Oakley, supra note 31, at 611 n. 1.
84. See Security Council, 2686th Meeting, supra note 25, at 8-10.
85. The increased incidence of terrorism, particularly state-sponsored terrorism, has be-
come a central world-order concern which has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject.
See generally N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1986, at A10, col. 3 (discussion on the Draft Report
prepared for lawmakers from the sixteen-member Atlantic Alliance); Laqueur, supra note 82;
Green, Double Standards in the United Nations: The Legalization of Terrorism, 18 ARCHLY
DES VOLKERRECHTS 129, 129-34 passim (1979), reprinted in part in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER 495 (1980).
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It is significant that one of South Africa's primary justifications for the
raids was that the U.S. government had set a precedent for such attacks
in Libya earlier in the year.86 This interpretation indicates an imperative
need for the superpowers to adhere scrupulously to international norms,
since their activities may be used by other states to legitimize arguably
similar actions. It must be emphasized, however, that the U.S. action in
Libya was not accepted as legitimate by the international community.87
Its precedential value was thus limited from the outset.
The South African raids also highlight the need to establish appropri-
ate criteria to define normative expectations regarding liberation move-
ments in international law.8 8 The central question posed for the purposes
of this incident is the legality of support given by individual states to such
movements. It has been argued that there is a right of self-defense
against racist and colonial domination and that, if force is used to deprive
subjected peoples of their right to self-determination, they have a right to
resort to force and to receive support from other states.89 This argument,
however, is not justified by the concept of self-defense as it is traditionally
understood in article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32, 43-44.
87. Although Libya was generally condemned for its terrorist acts, even the United States'
traditional allies dissociated themselves from the U.S. military action against Libya. Security
Council debates indicated that the use of force by the United States could not be excused, since
other peaceful options were available to respond to the Libyan menace. See generally U.N.
Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2674th-2683rd Meetings, U.N. Docs. S/
PV.2674-S/PV.2683 (Apr. 15, 1986-Apr. 24, 1986). The Draft Report, discussed supra note
85, was also highly critical of the U.S. raid on Libya, as was the Eighth Summit of the Non-
Aligned Movement in Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 1986. That summit unanimously con-
cluded that the air attack on Libya was "a grave precedent in international relations, and a
crime that is devoid of any political and moral value." Commitment to Struggle, AFRICA, Oct.
1986, at 20-21.
88. The status of national liberation movements is an issue about which much has been
written. For a general discussion on the subject, see generally Reisman, supra note 12; Sagay,
The Legal Status of Freedom Fighters in Africa, 6 E. AFR. L. REV. 15 (1973).
89. For example, African states, in conformity with the OAU Charter, claim that the use
of force to regulate violation of the norms of decolonization and anti-racism is legal, and that
the use of armed force is justified to end colonialism and to implement self-determination,
provided that this result cannot be achieved by peaceful means. Such arguments are frequently
used to justify state practice. For example, in 1961, India used force to end Portuguese colonial
domination of Goa. India argued at the Security Council that the U.N. Charter did not com-
pletely eschew force, since force could be used to achieve freedom where no other means were
available. The inability of the Security Council to censure India (due, in part, to the use of the
veto power) seems to have fortified certain state elite expectations that the use of force for the
express purpose of national liberation is legitimate. See 1 REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 148 (Supp. No. 3, 1972). For related arguments in state practice, see gener-
ally Dugard, The Organization of African Unity and Colonialism: An Inquiry into the Plea of
Self-Defense as a Justification for the Use of Force in the Eradication of Colonialism, 16 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 157 (1967).
436
South Africa's Incursions
Colonialism and racist domination do not, per se, involve an "armed
attack" on subjected peoples, nor does the related argument of "colonial-
ism as permanent aggression" justify a right of self defense against racial
and colonial domination. This concept disregards the doctrine of inter-
temporal law,90 according to which a title acquired by force, when force-
ful acquisition of such title was lawful, does not become invalid when
that method of acquisition is subsequently outlawed. Contemporary in-
ternational legal norms are not retroactive. Thus, it cannot plausibly be
maintained that the right of self-defense, which was not exercised at a
time when an attack occurred, can be exercised now, in the absence of an
armed attack. The initial use of force in support of national liberation
movements against racist domination (as in South Africa) cannot be jus-
tified with a self-defense argument.
The fact remains, however, that U.N. prescriptions overwhelmingly
support aid to national liberation movements. The 1974 Definition of
Aggression, for example, stipulates:
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way
prejudice the right... of peoples[,] ... particularly peoples under colonial
and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these
peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accord-
ance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-
mentioned Declaration. 91
This document, together with the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Rela-
tions,92 suggests that supporting armed liberation movements does not
constitute aggression. The provision of such support does not violate ar-
ticle 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, but rather is an action in furtherance of
the purposes and principles of the Charter. These declarations are au-
thoritative because they were adopted with the full participation and con-
sent of all nations, including those in the West.93 Although it may be
argued that such declarations have no real significance, because General
Assembly resolutions and declarations do not have any legally binding
90. On this doctrine, see Elias, The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 285
(1980).
91. Supra note 4, art. 7.
92. Supra note 4, at 121.
93. Both resolutions were adopted without a vote. See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0.
SCHACHTER & H. SMiT, BASIC DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 45,411
(1980). There was, therefore, consensus regarding their adoption in conformity with "a dis-
cernible trend from consent to consensus as the basis of international legal obligations." Falk,
On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 785
(1966).
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force,94 they have historically exercised a formative influence on the de-
velopment of international law.95
Resolutions on national liberation movements in particular have been
passed in substantially the same form over a considerable period of
time.96 They have been endorsed by overwhelming majorities of an ever
more inclusive U.N. membership. 97 Even the Western states' traditional
hostility to the idea of legitimating the provision of support to liberation
movements has evaporated. President Reagan, for example, has openly
declared that "[s]upport for freedom fighters is... totally consistent with
the OAS and UN Charters."98 Thus there seems to be an emerging con-
sensus that the use of armed force in support of liberation movements is
legal.
This norm furthers the goal of world public order. Recent trends in
the "world social process" 99 indicate an increased emphasis on the need
to uphold human dignity. The activities of organizations like the ANC
are aimed at eradicating practices as opprobrious as apartheid, colonial-
ism, racism, and genocide, all of which have been denounced by the in-
ternational community. The ANC's expressed goal is a democratic, non-
racist, and undivided South Africa. 100 It is fighting for the overthrow of
the system of apartheid, which is "a comprehensive and systematic pat-
tern of racial discrimination ... compris[ing] a complex set of practices
94. See, eg., Onuf, Professor Falk on the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General As-
sembly, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 349 (1970). It is undeniable that such resolutions are not a formal
source of law within the formulation of article 38(1) of the statute of the I.C.J. It is also true
that under the U.N. Charter, the Assembly does not have the legal competence to legislate or
to adopt legally-binding decisions, except those regarding certain organizational matters, like
procedural rules. U.N. CHARTER ch. IV.
95. 0. SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 111 (1985). As
Schachter explains, General Assembly resolutions are now regarded as expressions of common
interests and the "general will" of the international community. There is abundant literature
to refute the notion that General Assembly resolutions cannot even be regarded as evidence of
emerging international legal norms. See generally Falk, supra note 93, at 782; 0. ASAMOAH,
THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS (1966). See also Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 1971 J.C.J. 16.
96. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2105, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1966); G.A. Res. 2189, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 5-6, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967);
G.A. Res. 2908, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1973); G.A. Res.
3163, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 5-7, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 38/11, 38
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 22-23, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1983); G.A. Res. 38/39, 38 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 36-40, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1984).
97. Id.
98. 31 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 33,454 (1985).
99. "World social process" is a compendious term used to indicate that the expanding
circles of interaction among people extend to the remotest inhabitants of the globe ("world"),
and that the active participants of the interaction ("process") are living beings ("social"). See
M. McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, supra note 8, at 10.
100. Karis, South African Liberation: The Communist Factor, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 267, 268
(1986-87).
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of domination and subjection, intensely hierarchized and sustained by
the whole apparatus of the state, which affects the distribution of all val-
ues."' 0 1 Apartheid has variously been described as "a threat to interna-
tional peace and security,"' 0 2 "a crime against humanity,"' 0 3 a violation
of the Charter of the U.N., I° and "a crime against the conscience and
dignity of mankind."' 0 5 Apartheid arguably also falls within the defini-
tion of genocide incorporated in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 0 6 The world community has
an important and continuing interest in eradicating apartheid. In the
light of the opprobrium attached to such a system, it would be mere legal
sophistry to argue that international legal norms preclude the ANC from
seeking (with the active support of outside forces) to supplant the system
of apartheid.
The South African government's self-defense arguments also merit
consideration. 10 7 The circumstances under which the raids comprising
this incident were carried out suggest that they did not constitute a legiti-
mate act of self-defense. First, the raids were retaliatory and not preven-
101. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 521 (1980).
102. See, e.g., The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, G.A. Res.
3151, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 33, U.N. Doe. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 2923, 27
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 25, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 39/72, 39 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 40, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985). The OAU has similarly held that
"[the] racist terrorist South Africa's ... policy of apartheid constitutes a serious threat to
international peace and security." See Nairobi Resolution, supra note 4, at c-5 (emphasis
added).
103. See, eg., The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa,
G.A. Res. 2202, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 20, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); G.A. Res.
3324, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 38, U.N. Doe. A/9631 (1974).
104. Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 57.
105. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
106. 78 U.N.T.S. 277. The question of whether or not South Africa is a signatory to the
Convention is moot, because the relevant provisions of the Convention have become custom-
ary international law. That the prohibition on genocide is regarded asjus cogens was clearly
indicated by the I.C.J. in its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 1, 23-24; see also Jimenez de
Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 HAGUE RECUEIL 1, 64-67
(1978). The killing of anti-apartheid demonstrators in recent months violates article II(a) and
(b) of the Genocide Convention for "killing members of [a] group" or "causing serious bodily
or mental harm to members of [a] group." For a categorization of the various laws and activi-
ties of the South African government that could establish its acts as genocide, see Report of
The Special Committee Against Apartheid, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 22) at 55, U.N. Doc.
A/39/22 (1984); see also Kiapi, The Status of Apartheid in International Law, 17 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 57, 57-58 (1977).
107. The instances in which self-defense can be invoked in international law have been
exhaustively examined in the literature. See, e.g., Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defence,
37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 183 (1961); D. BowETr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1958); McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597
(1963); Dugard, supra note 89.
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tive. The difference between self-defense and reprisal lies essentially in
the aim of the action. Self-defense is aimed at protecting the security of a
state and its essential rights of territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence. A reprisal, on the other hand, is punitive in nature.'08 Signifi-
cantly, none of South Africa's raids into neighboring African states in the
past have been launched in order to prevent an impending or imminent
guerrilla attack. South Africa has always implied that the raids have
been conducted as a result of, rather than in anticipation of, an attack on
it. The raids were directed against public buildings and private houses,
and, in the case of Zimbabwe, against ANC political offices.' 0 9 It is diffi-
cult to believe that ANC offices and refugee camps were ANC "opera-
tional centres" and "transit facilities" threatening the security of South
Africa. 110
Second, self-defense, as traditionally understood, is confined to cases in
which "the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.""' The
contention that these conditions were present in Southern Africa at the
time of the raids is difficult to support. Although the very definition of
self-defense indicates that it contains a temporal element, the conflict be-
tween the ANC and the South African government has been continuous
and long-lasting, not a sudden occurrence calling for an "instant" South
African reaction. Furthermore, the raids reflected a failure to exhaust
other remedies. Negotiations aimed at a peaceful settlement had reached
an advanced stage at the very time of the attacks."12
108. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1972).
109. According to the Zimbabwean representative, all states seemed to agree that the
choice of targets was militarily dubious. See Security Council, 2686th Meeting, supra note 25,
at 83-85. The fact that the raids killed only three people and were aimed mostly at empty
buildings suggests that "the real purpose of the exercise was less strategic than political or
psychological." Smith, supra note 16, at 40.
110. It has been asserted that South Africa's use of force was not meant to destroy the
ANC, but rather to punish the Southern African states for the support which they had pro-
vided to South African refugees as well as to the ANC. Security Council Resolution 527 ob-
served that South Africa's attack on Lesotho in 1982 was not aimed at destroying insurgents,
but rather at "weakening the humanitarian support given by Lesotho to South African refu-
gees." S.C. Res. 527, 37 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. at 20, U.N. Doc. S/INF/38 (1982). Sanc-
tioning such raids would therefore set a dangerous precedent; it would diminish the protection
afforded to refugees under international law and result in a situation where one state could use
force against another under the pretext that the latter was providing sanctuary to refugees
from the former.
111. The Caroline, 2 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906).
112. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
440
Vol. 12:421, 1987
South Africa's Incursions
Third, an argument of self-defense immediately invokes the full force
of article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 113 Article 51 requires that measures
taken in self-defense "shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council." South Africa completely ignored this procedural
requirement. 114
The Southern African states claim that they do not give military sup-
port to the ANC, nor do they allow ANC military activities to take place
on their territories.1 15 Assuming for the sake of argument that these
states do grant the ANC military support, such support in itself does not
necessarily amount to an armed attack on South Africa justifying its re-
sort to self-defense. The reaction of the international community to the
South African raids indicates that the raids were not in conformity with
existing or emerging expectations regarding the right to resort to unilat-
eral use of force. State elites have been reluctan~t to widen the concept of
armed attack. Conversely, they have been unwilling to broaden the scope
of the self-defense exception enshrined in article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
Such a broadening would disrupt the international order, allowing uni-
lateral recourse to force even when peaceful means are available to solve
disputes.
The I.C.J. also addressed the issue of armed attack in the Nicaragua
case. In its words, "the Court does not believe that the concept of
'armed attack' includes not only acts by armed bands where such acts
occur on a significant scale but also assistance to rebels in the form of the
provision of weapons or logistical or other support."'1 6 It went on to
hold:
While the concept of an armed attack includes the despatch by one State of
armed bands into the territory of another State, the supply of arms and
113. On the operation of article 51 of the U.N. Charter, see generally Waldock, The Regu-
lation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 HAGUE RECUEIL 455
(1952).
114. Admittedly, the I.C.J. has held that, in the context of customary international law, the
reporting obligation in article 51 does not exist. Nicaragua, Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 121, para.
235. But that is a far cry from arguing that the requirement does not exist in conventional
international law. Many states have adhered to the reporting requirement by informing the
Security Council immediately of acts purportedly taken in self-defense. See, e.g., 38 U.N.
SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1983) at 127, U.N. Doc. S/16197 (U.S. report pursuant to article 51
of its action taken in Lebanon as an exercise of its inherent right of self-defense); 37 U.N.
SCOR Supp. (Apr.-June 1982) at 59, U.N. Doc. S/15025 (U.K. report of its action taken in
the Falkland Islands as an exercise of self-defense). Also note that the U.S. government, in
conformity with its view that the air raid on Libya was an act of self-defense, immediately
reported its action to the Security Council. See Leigh, supra note 44, at 632.
115. It is beyond the scope of this incident study to assess the truth or falsity of these
claims and counterclaims. For purposes of clarity in analysis, however, it will be assumed that
the military arm of the ANC actively operates in South Africa, with the collaboration of the
Southern African states.
116. Nicaragua, Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 103, para. 195.
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other support to such bands cannot be equated with armed attack. Never-
theless, such activities may well constitute ... an intervention in the inter-
nal affairs of a State, that is, a form of conduct which is certainly wrongful,
but is of lesser gravity than an armed attack. 11 7
This holding of the Court is not only consistent with, but also dictated
by, the requirements for the maintenance of minimum world order.
Granting logistical support to opposition groups is an everyday part of
interstate relations. To hold that this kind of support amounts to an
armed attack would open up a hornets' nest, allowing states to launch
raids upon the flimsiest of excuses, all in the name of self-defense.118
This development would exacerbate the use of the military instrument as
a means of solving disputes.
The desirable conclusion, therefore, is that granting support to opposi-
tion groups (not to mention legitimate liberation movements) does not
constitute an armed attack. This does not, however, rule out the fact
that such support could, in certain instances, constitute a violation of the
principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. In such a
situation, other international legal remedies, such as the use of the diplo-
matic or the economic instrument, would be available to the wronged
state.
117. Id. at 126, para. 247; cf. dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel, id. at 331-48, paras.
154-73 (arguing that support for insurgents violates article 2(4) and, accordingly, permits a
violent response in self-defense). The I.C.J. decision has not been accepted by the United
States. After participating fully in the proceedings on provisional measures, the jurisdiction of
the Court, and the admissibility of the Nicaraguan Application, the U.S. government withdrew
from all further proceedings in the case, denounced the Court's jurisdictional judgment of
November 26, 1984, and purported to reserve its rights as to any future decision by the Court.
U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceeding Initiated by Nicaragua in the IC, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL.
64 (Mar. 1985). For comments on the Nicaragua case, see Moore, The Secret War in Central
America and the Future of World Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (1986) (advancing legal argu-
ments that could be used by the Reagan Administration in an attempt to justify defying an
adverse judgement on the merits by the I.C.J.). Cf. Rowles, "Secret Wars, " Self-Defense and
the Charter-A Reply to Professor Moore, id. at 568, 582 (arguing that neither Professor Moore
nor the United States can defy the I.C.J.'s judgment and then view the resultant undercutting
of the principle of international adjudication and the authority of the I.C.J. to be in the United
States' interest). For further commentaries on the Nicaragua case, see generally Appraisals of
the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1987); Kahn,
From Nuremberg to the Hague: The United States Position in Nicaragua v. United States and
the Development of International Law, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1987).
118. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 117, at 21 ("To find an armed attack is to find authoriza-
tion for a military response .... Packed into a determination that an 'armed attack' has
occurred are many of the most important functions of an international legal order. It is not a
determination that should be made lightly.").
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Conclusion
The South African incident has highlighted the need for an end to the
system of apartheid. 119 It has drawn into sharp focus the distinction be-
tween national liberation movements and terrorist movements. It has
reinforced the normative perceptions of state elites regarding the legiti-
macy of granting moral and material support to national liberation
movements, and the illegitimacy of using self-defense arguments as an
excuse to crush such movements. It has enhanced the status of the ANC
and given it greater legitimacy in the international community. Finally,
it has strengthened the principle of an overriding obligation to seek
peaceful settlement of disputes before resorting to force. For these rea-
sons, it is hoped that signals sent to the South African government by the
international community will contribute to an atmosphere of greater sta-
bility in the Southern African region.
119. As established previously, the frequent South African raids are largely attributable to
the practice of apartheid. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72. Institutions in the inter-
national arena and strategies available to put continued pressure on the South African govern-
ment include: (a) the Security Council (on this institution's primary responsibility for
international peace and security, see generally L. GOODRICH & A. SIMONS, THE UNITED NA-
TIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (1955)); (b) the
General Assembly and the OAU (see U.N. CHARTER ch. VIII, on regional organizations;
O.A.U. CHARTER, reprinted in 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 873 (1964); F. OKOYE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE NEW AFRICAN STATES (1972)); and (c) unilateral humanitarian intervention
effectively carried out and immediately submitted to inclusive authoritative appraisal (on
claims for and against a right of humanitarian intervention, see the dispute between Brownlie,
Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (J. Moore
ed. 1974), and Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for
Constructive Alternatives, id. at 229). See also Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect
the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 177 (R. Lillich ed.
1973); Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205
(1969).
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